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Abstract 
In 1915, the Union of South Africa was requested to administrate South 
West Africa (SWA) (today Namibia) on behalf of the British Crown and 
approved the South West Africa Mandate.  The policies of the Union 
strongly influenced the administration of SWA, and the administration met 
with indigenous opposition discontent with the maltreatment.  An attitude of 
master and servant was prevalent in the mandated territory and the 
maltreatment of the indigenous people in the mandated territory, racial 
prejudice, double standards in executing branding laws, enforced indentured 
labour, dog and hut tax were some of the grievances that the Bondelswarts, 
the Rehoboth Basters and the Ukuambi had against the SWA 
Administration.  The Administration perceived these actions as internal 
unrest and subdued it using police and military resources. 
Suppressing unrest through force was part of the military policing 
tradition prevalent in Southern Africa and abroad during the colonial era.  
The tactical deployment of ground forces in conjunction with aircraft was an 
innovation that transformed future operations in SWA between the 
suppression of the Bondelswarts and the actions against Chief Ipumbu.   
This article discusses the utilisation of the Union Defence Force 
(UDF) and South West Africa Forces against indigenous people of South 
West Africa between the two world wars focusing on three incidents over 
the period 1922 to 1932.  Tactical deployments of ground forces and the 
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application of air power in support of ground forces to suppress internal 
unrest are explained and discussed.  These discussions provide the military 
historian with salient facts on physical conditions encountered, the tactics 
employed and the role of a new weapon system, aircraft, yet to be fully 
understood in its role as a force multiplier.  
Keywords: internal unrest, aircraft, tactical deployments, Bondelswarts, 
Rehoboth, Ukuambi, Ipumbu, SWA (South West Africa), Namibia 
Introduction 
The Union of South Africa invaded German South West Africa (today 
Namibia) during the First World War to protect British strategic interests.  
Between 1915 and 1920, the territory was occupied by the Union Defence 
Force (UDF) and managed as a military protectorate with E.H.L. Gorges as 
Administrator to advise the military in managing the territory.  In the 
aftermath of World War I, German colonies were classified as A-, B- or C-
class mandates, depending on the indigenous population’s stage of 
development, the colony’s geographical position, its economic condition, 
etc.  SWA became a C-class mandate and entrusted to the British Crown.  
The Union of South Africa was requested to administrate South West Africa 
(SWA) on behalf of the British Crown, and approved the South West Africa 
Mandate Act No. 49 of 1919.  The mandate was signed on 17 December 
1920, martial law was recalled and the civilian administration was awarded 
the authority to rule South West Africa as a mandated territory from 1 
January 1921.1   
The mandate conferred full power of administration and legislation on 
South Africa and stated that the territory was an integral portion of the 
Union of South Africa and could apply laws of the Union of South Africa 
with local modifications as circumstances may require.  Various other 
requirements were set, which prohibited slavery, forced labour, supply of 
intoxicating spirits and beverages and military training other than protecting 
the territory.  The League of Nations emphasised social development and the 
enhancement of material and moral wellbeing of the indigenous populations.  
G.R. Hofmeyer replaced Gorges as the Administrator-General and reported 
to the Prime Minister of the Union who in turn was to provide annual 
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reports to the Council of the League of Nations on measures taken to fulfil 
the Mandate of South West Africa.2  
The policies of the Union strongly influenced the administration of 
SWA.  Silvester, Wallace and Hayes argue that SWA policies regarding 
indigenous populations were formed using existing Union policies that 
regulated the flow of labour and control over indigenous populations.3  An 
attitude of master and servant was obvious in the mandated territory and 
Tony Emmet refers to a report from a military magistrate in 1920 that notes 
the attitude of a white farmer perceiving the indigenous population as sub-
human, and which must receive a hiding once a day to ensure their 
obedience.4  The maltreatment of the indigenous people in the mandated 
territory, racial prejudice, double standards in executing branding laws, 
enforced indentured labour, dog and hut tax were some of the grievances 
that the Bondelswarts, the Rehoboth Basters and the Ukuambi had against 
the SWA Administration.5  
Their grievances were not attended to by the Administration who 
perceived it as direct opposition to administrative authority.  New political 
organisations like the Industrial and Commercial Workers Union (ICU, 
1921), the African People’s Organisation (APO, 1922) and the South West 
Africa National Congress (SWANC, 1922) within urban centres increased 
anxieties that the indigenous population would unite politically and contest 
for suffrage and self-determination for the whole of SWA.6  The 
Bondelswarts, Rehoboth and the Ukuambi discussed their respective 
grievances with the Administration, who refused to repeal the laws causing 
the grievance and enforced their authority through the application of force.  
The Administration perceived these actions as internal unrest and subdued it 
using police and military resources.  
Literature on indigenous uprisings in South West Africa during the 
inter-war period is informative and provides insight into social structures 
and the political background of the uprisings, but lack detail regarding 
tactical deployments, force strength, weapons used and challenges faced.  
This article serves to enhance the available literature with such additional 
information. Valuable background information was found in literature 
pertaining to Namibian history such as Namibia: The violent heritage (1986) 
by D. Soggot, A history of resistance in Namibia (1988) by P.H Katjavivi, 
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and T. Emmett’s book, Popular resistance and the roots of nationalism in 
Namibia, 1915–1966 (1999), but it offered very little for the military 
historian.  In R. Freislich’s The last tribal stand: A history of the 
Bondelswart uprising (1964), the Bondelswarts uprising is described in 
detail.  It also receives attention in A.M. Davey’s The Bondelswarts affair 
(1961) and G.L.M. Lewis’s unpublished MA thesis, “The Bondelswarts 
rebellion of 1922” (1977) that contextualises the political and social issues 
associated with the uprising, but which is limited in its ability to 
contextualise military manoeuvres.   
There are useful sources available on the Rehoboth “Basters” such as 
P. Pearson’s The history and social structure of the Rehoboth Baster 
community of Namibia (1985), R.G. Britz’s A concise history of the 
Rehoboth Basters until 1990 (1999) and an unpublished D Litt thesis by 
G.J.J. Oosthuizen, “Die Rehoboth-basters binne die konteks van die 
staatkundige verhoudinge tussen Suidwes-Afrika en Suid-Afrika, 1915–
1939” (1993).  These sources expand greatly on political and social issues, 
but do not cover the use of military force with significant detail.  The 
uprising and suppression of the Ukuambi tribe in 1932 is mostly discussed 
in government reports delivered to Parliament and very little published 
literature was traced. 
This article addresses the shortfall in published literature on tactical 
deployments, and the author derived great insight from archival sources in 
the National and the SA National Defence Force (SANDF) Archives that 
provided reports and correspondence illustrating the tactical deployment of 
Union forces.  The most useful archive groups at the National Archives of 
South Africa are the archives of the Secretary of Native Affairs, the archives 
of the Governor-General, the archives of the Minister of Justice, the archives 
of the South African Party and the archives of the Prime Minister.  The most 
informative archive groups at the SANDF Archives are the “Accessions” 
and the archives of the Adjutant General, the Chief of the General Staff, the 
Secretary of Defence, the Chief of Defence Force Administration and the 
Union War Histories. 
This article discusses the utilisation of the Union Defence Force 
(UDF) and South West Africa Forces against indigenous people of South 
West Africa between the two World Wars focusing on three incidents over 
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the period 1922 to 1932.  The heritage of military policing is briefly 
discussed to contextualise the role the police and military forces played 
during times of peace to police the urban and rural areas respectively within 
the Union and SWA.  The SWA Administration applied many Union 
policies and legislation to their own conditions and found opposition to them 
from the Bondelswarts and the Rehoboth.  Chief Ipumbu openly opposed 
the administration’s authority and was a destabilising influence in 
Ovamboland.  Instead of focusing on their grievances, military force was 
applied in a calculated manner to suppress the uprisings quickly and with 
minimum loss of life.  These actions were heavily criticised by opposition 
parties in the Union as well as the Permanent Mandates Commission who 
viewed these actions as contrary to the essence of administering a mandate. 
This article is not a social or political history per se, but a military history of 
the Union of South Africa and South West Africa’s military forces to 
suppress internal unrest in South West Africa as a mandated territory of the 
Union between the two world wars from 1922 to 1932.  Tactical 
deployments of ground forces and the application of air power in support of 
ground forces to suppress internal unrest are explained and discussed.  These 
discussions provide the military historian with salient facts on physical 
conditions encountered, the tactics employed and the role of a new weapon 
system, namely aircraft, which had yet to be fully understood in its role as a 
force multiplier. 
The Heritage of Military Policing in South Africa and its Application in 
South West Africa 
The gradual colonisation of South Africa had a direct effect on the 
indigenous population of South West Africa.  They faced the dilemma of 
either displacement or integration.  Whatever choices were made profoundly 
affected them.  Tribal cohesion and traditional values were lost in the 
constant battle to regain the land taken from them by the colonists.  The use 
of military power was instrumental in facilitating the growth of Jan van 
Riebeeck’s small refreshment post into a thriving colony at the southern tip 
of Africa.  These actions did not only include military expeditions, but also 
the policing of the settled areas by militant means.7  South Africa is not 
unique in this policing tradition, as this was the norm for many western 
colonial powers. 
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The European colonisation of the various African territories was met 
with fierce indigenous resistance.  Germany consistently carried out military 
expeditions in German East Africa from 1889 to 1907, including the Maji-
Maji (1905–1907) as well as German South West Africa with the Herero 
revolt from 1904–1907.  The indigenous populations of West and North-
Central Africa bravely resisted French colonisation, but were eventually 
suppressed by French colonial forces.  Resistance was especially fierce in 
Algeria (1903–1910) and Morocco (1912–1934).  British colonisation in 
West Africa encountered fierce resistance from the indigenous populations 
of Nigeria (1892–1902) and the Gold Coast (1895–1900), as was the case in 
South Africa.  The Basutos (1868), the Xhosas (1878), the Pedi and the 
Zulus (1879), the Boers of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State (1899–
1902) and other groups resisted this colonial drive, but eventually all 
succumbed to European rule.8   
The military played a significant role in suppressing the uprisings in 
the various colonies and the general approach of colonial forces in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries was that the use of extreme force and superior 
firepower was an appropriate response to suppress the uprising of local 
inhabitants.  Technological advances enabled expanding colonial 
communities to counter indigenous resistance to white settlement 
successfully.  Indigenous weapons, such as the bow and arrow and the spear 
were overwhelmed by colonial firepower.  The technologically 
disadvantaged indigenous populations were subjugated eventually by the use 
of military force and firepower.  Steamships, prophylaxes, developments in 
communications and modern weapons, such as air power and the machine 
gun, assisted the Europeans to consolidate their power.  A few examples 
were the Xhosas who were beaten decisively in 1878 after nine frontier 
wars, the Pedi and the Zulus who were subjugated in 1878 and 1879, and in 
1885 control was established over the Tswana-speaking people and their 
territory.  Firepower was the key to ensuring the settlement of South Africa 
by populations migrating from Europe.9  
The justification to use force to suppress indigenous communities in 
South West Africa was derived from a combined heritage of British and 
Boer military policing attitudes prevalent in the Union of South Africa, 
where force was applied by the British through their Empire to enforce 
peace and by the Boers to pacify the rural environment and protect their 
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agricultural interests.  The structures that facilitated the victories were the 
British military regiments and the Boer commandos.  John Brewer states, 
“Police bodies in South Africa began as colonial forces […] and retained 
most of the features of this model as the 20th century progressed.”10   
Brewer further states, “Union was in part an act of decolonisation for 
Whites, but it left a tremendous task of internal colonialism in monitoring, 
regulating and controlling the Black population.”11  This reflects the need of 
the state to have a police force to continue the regulation of race relations, 
but also to have a modern police force to police whites.  The formation of 
the South African Mounted Riflemen (SAMR) and the SA Police implied 
two separate police forces each with its own jurisdiction, function and style.  
The military policing tradition of the paramilitary and civil police forces in 
South Africa before 1910 was passed on in 1912 to the newly formed Union 
Defence Force (UDF).  The new SAMR, the Permanent Force of the UDF 
under Brig. Gen. H.T. Lukin, consisted of five regiments and was formed 
from parts of the old colonial police and military units, which continued 
their original policing duties after formation.12  
The SA Police and the SAMR were responsible for policing the urban 
and the rural areas respectively.  The construction of the SAMR was a 
product of its time as a solution to the policing of the indigenous populations 
in the rural areas.  The SAMR was mounted, paramilitary in style and was 
intended for military service during times of war, but in times of peace, it 
was used exclusively to police the black population.  As a military unit, it 
was better equipped than the police to enforce law and order in black areas 
and to deal with black resistance to white domination.  After the SAMR had 
been promulgated under the 1912 Defence Act, rural policing was the 
responsibility of the UDF.13  
The method in dealing with indigenous unrest was clearly stipulated, 
as instructed by the Prime Minister to the UDF, in a 1918 notice to all 
district staff officers.  The magistrates and native commissioners were to be 
involved in the process with instructions to report and await instructions.  
The UDF’s policing role manifested in various ways and included show of 
force to distant rural settlements as well as dispersing indigenous 
mineworkers on strike. In 1919, they dispersed the strikers of the SA 
Collieries at Dundee, Utrecht and Pietermaritzburg while the Under-
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secretary for Native Affairs requested the SAMR in Springbok to deal with 
an armed indigenous group squatting on the SWA and Union border.14 Two 
years later, in 1921, the UDF supported the SA Police in dispersing the 
Israelites from Bulhoek at Queenstown.15  Military force was not 
exclusively used against indigenous populations, but also against white 
mineworkers in 1913, 1914 and again in 1922.  The Rebellion of 1914–
1915, consisting of mainly white Boers who were veterans of the Second 
Anglo-Boer War, was also suppressed.16 
The UDF in SWA continued its policing role under the martial law 
that governed the military protectorate from 1915 to 1920.  Members of the 
UDF’s SAMR, who served in SWA at the end of 1919, were seconded to 
the SWA Administration to form the SWA military force.  The SWA Police 
was formed as a separate force with the South African Police Act and 
system applied to it, with the SAMR Military Constabulary present in SWA 
forming the backbone of its rank and file.  Those members who were not 
selected were demobilised on 31 March 1920.  The head of the SWA Police 
was a deputy commissioner chosen by the commissioner and seconded to 
the Administration.17  The military and police forces in SWA mirrored the 
UDF and SA Police respectively in role and function.  It is therefore not 
surprising that these forces were called to action in 1922 against the 
Bondelswarts. 
The Uprising of the Bondelswarts, May to June 1922 
The Bondelswarts, indigenous to the South West African region, known 
today as Southern Namibia and the Northern Cape in South Africa, were the 
masters of the south before the German occupation.  They were a nomadic, 
pastoral people whose stock consisted of goats and cattle with their main 
sustenance derived from the hunting of game.  The Bondelswarts were 
defeated in a protracted war against the Germans from 1903 to 1906, but 
their reputation as fierce, ruthless and cunning fighters was confirmed.  In 
their natural stronghold, the Fish River Canyon, they employed guerrilla 
tactics to good effect to keep the German forces at bay.  Jacobus Cristiaan 
and Abraham Morris were leading figures amongst the Bondelswarts during 
their conflict.  Cristiaan was the hereditary chief and Morris fought as a 
captain.  He made a name for himself as being a capable and resourceful 
leader and a master of guerrilla tactics.  Both feared retribution from the 
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Germans and fled across the Orange River into the Northern Cape after a 
peace treaty was signed, where they stayed until after the War. 18 
The Bondelswarts expected the new Administration to abolish the 
restrictions of the German treaty, but the conditions of the treaty were only 
confirmed.  Resentment towards the Administration as well as prevailing 
economic hardships during a drought fermented dissent amongst the 
impoverished Bondelswarts who complained they had, “only exchanged one 
yoke for another”.19  Their grievances towards the Administration included  
(a) The discriminatory practice to have the white farmers keep their 
cattle branding irons whereas they were not allowed for the 
prevention of stock theft;  
(b) A concerted effort to invent and apply dog taxes and hunting 
regulations to impoverish the Bondelswarts and force them to 
work under the old German regulation that stated indigenous men 
had to enter the labour market if they had no visible means of 
support.  Interpreted by the Administration as having less than ten 
head of cattle or fifty head of small stock, many indigenous people 
sought work in the towns where access was strictly controlled and 
no vagrancy allowed. Many were forced to seek work on 
commercial farms;  
(c) Viewing the police with suspicion and fear as well as experiencing 
them as harsh, provocative and unnecessarily severe.  The police, 
on the other hand, viewed the Bondelswarts as insolent, lazy and 
thievish.  The general view of the police was that they were 
policing a subservient race and insolence was rewarded with 
flogging;  
(d) Land allocation discrepancies between the Bondelswarts sketch 
provided to them by the German Commission and the official 
survey map which the Administration accepted as the true 
reflection of boundaries that severely limited their lands for 
grazing; and  
(e) The Administration’s refusal to acknowledge tribal leadership 
when their true chief Jacobus Cristiaan returned in 1919.  They 
reconfirmed the appointment of Timothy Beukes and charged 
Cristiaan as illegal alien and for shipping cattle across the border 
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without authorisation.  The sentence of a £100 fine or 12 months’ 
imprisonment was suspended, but antagonised many 
Bondelswarts.20 
In 1922, fear of an indigenous uprising amongst the white farmers of 
the region created an atmosphere of paranoia in which any large movement 
by the Bondelswarts was seen as a possible mobilisation.  Cristiaan and 50 
of his followers were no exception.  More Bondelswarts crossed the Orange 
River in the wake of Cristiaan’s return.  Their return sparked fears of unrest 
and the relationship between the Bondelswarts and the police, as well as the 
Bondelswarts and the white farmers, deteriorated.  The tension reached 
breaking point with the return of Abraham Morris in April 1922.  Morris 
embodied the fighting spirit of the Bondelswarts and he was given a hero’s 
welcome when he arrived at Guruchas.  The Native Affairs Commission was 
unable to ascertain the motive for his return to Guruchas, but his return was 
perceived by many Bondelswarts that they would rise again.  He would lead 
them in tearing up the treaty and in the process reclaim what was rightfully 
theirs.  Scores of Bondelswarts apparently believed some action would 
follow, converging on Haib and Guruchas soon after Morris had returned.21 
However, his return was not kept secret.  Cristiaan notified the 
Location Superintendent, Noothout, stationed at Driehoek, who in turn 
notified the magistrate at Warmbad.  The information reached the ears of 
Hofmeyer, who issued instructions that Morris must be arrested and charged 
with 
(a) Bringing sixteen rifles into the territory of SWA without permits;  
(b) Bringing cattle over the border without a permit; and  
(c) Entering the territory without a permit.   
On 5 May 1922, Sgt Van Niekerk and Native Constable Gert Kraai 
were ordered to arrest Morris on these charges.  Their attempt to arrest 
Morris was obstructed by the tribe.  It was the opinion of the tribe that 
Morris had done nothing wrong and their champion would not go to gaol.  
Angry words were exchanged, which the Bondelswarts accepted as a 
declaration of war.  The word of an impending conflict spread through the 
reserve, whereby the Bondelswarts converged on Haib and Guruchas with 
their stock, possessions and rifles.22 
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Attempts to lure Cristiaan and other Bondelswarts out of the reserve 
under false pretences of meetings were unsuccessful.  Hofmeyer sent the 
Commissioner of Police in South West Africa, Maj. C.A. van Coller, under 
the flag of truce to negotiate an amiable solution, but at the same time 
mobilised volunteers undermining Van Coller’s attempts.  Hofmeyer’s 
duality clouded the process of Van Coller’s attempt to facilitate the arrest of 
Morris and four other members on related charges peacefully.  Van Coller’s 
discussions failed to deliver the members for arrest and by 20 May, 
Hofmeyer issued an ultimatum that called for Morris and four tribesmen to 
hand themselves over for trial, the surrender of all arms and ammunition and 
the obstruction of officers of the law to stop, or there would be dire 
consequences for the whole tribe.  The Bondelswarts rejected the ultimatum 
and continued preparations for the coming conflict.  Over the period 22 to 
25 May 1922, various farms were raided for horses, supplies, rifles and 
ammunition.  These raids included the house of the Superintendent of the 
Bondelswarts Reserve, Noothout, himself.  The raids were executed at 
gunpoint, but nobody was injured or physically abused.  In a separate 
incident, three Namas attacked and murdered Mrs Lydia Sarah Coleman on 
the farm Kubub near Lüderitz.  This unrelated incident only heightened 
white fears and anti-Bondelswarts feelings.23 
It was important for Hofmeyer to resolve the situation quickly and 
quietly for various reasons.  He was in charge of a mandated territory and 
had to answer to the Union of South Africa.  The Union in turn had to 
answer to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations.  
A clash between Administration forces and an indigenous group, who they 
were supposed to develop and to hold in sacred trust, was an undesirable 
situation.  However, a prolonged uprising by the Bondelswarts constituted 
the danger of further uprisings by other indigenous populations in the 
territory.  This was even more undesirable and Hofmeyer did not wish to 
have to explain to Gen. Smuts why a general uprising had occurred.  
Hofmeyer was therefore reluctant to involve the Union in the matter and 
altruistically pointed out that the Union were still reeling from the Rand 
strike of 1922 and that the settlers in SWA had an opportunity to prove 
themselves worthy of the privileges they enjoyed by helping to suppress the 
uprising.  Aid from the Union, however, was forthcoming and came in the 
form of two De Havilland D.H. 9 aeroplanes, two mountain guns and four 
Vickers machineguns with the respective personnel.  Col. Sir P. van 
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Ryneveld, Director Air Services, was in command of the aeroplanes.  The 
Administration’s forces mobilised and arrived at Kalkfontein South on 23 
May.24  
Hofmeyer, a former clerk of the Union House of Assembly, appointed 
himself commander of the combined force and bestowed upon himself the 
rank of colonel.  Ironically, he was of the opinion that there was a lack of 
experienced commanders in the mandated territory and that he could not 
wait for the Union to send an able commander, because quick action was 
called for.  However, the UDF did send a liaison officer with the support 
weapons, Maj. A.H. Prins, to assist Hofmeyer during the conflict.  The 
volunteers arrived steadily at Kalkfontein South from the Gibeon, 
Keetmanshoop, Aroab and Warmbad districts and were grouped into 
squadrons.  The Union contingent joined the Administration’s force at 
Kalkfontein South on 26 May (see Table 1: Composition of the SWA 
Administration Force).  Employing siege tactics against the Bondelswarts, 
Hofmeyer enveloped their positions at Guruchas and Haib by occupying the 
waterholes situated at Wortel, Driehoek, Dawigabis, Neufontein, Auputs and 
Norachas.  He planned to deprive them of food and water and to cut off their 
retreat to the Orange River and the Fish River Canyon.25 
Unit Officers Other ranks Total 
Headquarters 5 4 9 
A Squadron 4 103 107 
B Squadron 4 88 92 
C Squadron 4 70 74 
D Squadron 2 47 49 
Mountain gun section 1 13 14 
Machinegun section 2 15 17 
Signalling sections  8 8 
Total 22 348 370 
Table 1: The composition of the SWA Administration Force.26 
 
South of the Orange River, forces from the Union prepared to 
intercept Bondelswarts crossing the border.  The head of the South African 
Police in the Western Districts, Lt. Col. H.F. Trew, instructed 
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reinforcements in the Steinkopf region to assist with border patrols.  Smuts 
made it clear to Trew that the police were not allowed, under any 
circumstances, to cross the border and participate in the expedition against 
the Bondelswarts.  Lt. Col. A.H.M. Nussey, the staff officer of the 
Potchefstroom Military District, was sent with orders by the Prime Minister 
to support the police and to prepare for the possible rapid deployment of 
volunteers in the event that military intervention became necessary.27 
 
Figure 1: The Bondelswarts reserve.28 
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The Bondelswarts organised their hierarchy, with Cristiaan as the 
hereditary chief and Morris as the war chief with a few vice-captains.  Each 
vice-captain was in charge of a commando, which was divided into sections.  
They still had a severe shortage of arms and ammunition, but their raiding 
strategy was to ambush the soldiers and relieve them of their weapons and 
ammunition.29  During their war with the Germans, the Bondelswarts 
executed this tactic efficiently and they were hopeful of more successes.  
Morris sent Babab, also known as Klaas Isaacks, and Adam Pienaar to 
Driehoek and Wortel with a commando of 75 men to dominate the direct 
line of advance towards Guruchas from Kalkfontein South (see Figure 1).  
Morris accompanied by Beukes and a commando of 50 men, moved east 
towards Warmbad.  Beukes later testified that their intention was to link up 
with the Warmbad Bondelswarts.  An attack on Warmbad would divide 
Hofmeyer’s force and divert his concentration from the reserve.  Cristiaan 
and the rest of the Bondelswarts occupied the hilly western region of the 
reserve around Guruchas and Us.30 
On 25 May, Capt. J.C. Balt marched with C Squadron, a machine gun 
section and a heliographic team on Norachas, after they had disembarked 
from the train at Klein Karas.  On 26 May, Capt. Jordaan was ordered to 
occupy Driehoek and Wortel with D squadron, comprising 47 unmounted 
men, one machine gun and 21 mounted men.  They were transported with 
trucks and were escorted to their objective by two troops of mounted rifles, 
Capt. Du Preez and Capt. Prinsloo each being in command of a troop.  The 
advancing column of D Squadron narrowly missed an ambush laid by Babab 
at Driehoek.  Their choice to take a higher route to avoid the soft sand, 
because of the vehicles, took them past the ambushing party, who in turn 
was caught off guard.  A firefight ensued and the Bondelswarts were driven 
off without one rifle being captured.  The pursuit had to be called off due to 
bad light.  The advancing force had only one fatal casualty, but the 
Bondelswarts left three wounded, nineteen killed and nine prisoners behind.  
The prisoners were duly sent to Kalkfontein South.31 
Upon hearing of the Bondelswarts’ reverse at Driehoek, Morris 
immediately returned to Guruchas.  His plan to fight on an extended front 
was abolished.  The failure of the Bondelswarts to acquire more weapons 
and ammunition was a serious setback for their combat power, but Morris 
deployed the Bondelswarts in and around Guruchas in defensive positions, 
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hoping to make the Administration’s forces pay dearly for every inch of 
ground.  The Bondelswarts numbered some 1 100 people, with 600 cattle 
and 8 000 small stock.32 
The troops of Du Preez and Prinsloo returned on the night of 26 May 
to prepare for the advance the following day.  The next day, 27 May, A 
Squadron, two mountain guns, two machineguns and a heliograph section 
accompanied Hofmeyer and the HQ personnel as they advanced towards 
Neufontein via Dawigabis.  Prinsloo and his troop provided the advance and 
the screens, while Du Preez was placed in charge of B Squadron, which 
covered the rear of the advancing column.  On 28 May, the HQ was 
established at Neufontein.  Prinsloo received orders to advance from 
Dawigabis towards Auputs on 27 May and joined Balt’s C Squadron, which 
had advanced from Norachas towards Guruchas.  Prinsloo’s squadron took a 
direct line of advance towards Auputs, which took him past the waterhole 
Us, close to Guruchas.  Pienaar ambushed Prinsloo and his men near Us on 
28 May, but the trap was sprung too quickly.  Prinsloo had one fatality and 
three wounded, while Pienaar was shot and killed.  The Bondelswarts were 
driven off and the forces occupied all the waterholes around Guruchas.33 
The Administration’s forces surrounded Guruchas, and Hofmeyer 
attacked the stronghold on 29 May at 15:00.  The mountain guns opened fire 
from a commanding position east of the objective as soon as the aeroplanes 
commenced their bombing.  Machine gun and rifle fire accompanied the 
aerial and artillery bombardment.  The aerial bombardment concentrated on 
enemy strong points and concentrated stock.  Stock was very dear to the 
Bondelswarts and the subsequent killing of their stock was a severe blow to 
their fighting spirit.  The aeroplanes would fly over advancing columns and 
fire ahead on their line of advance and occasionally bomb a position.  This 
co-ordinated air and ground assault afforded the advancing troops the 
opportunity to make excellent use of air cover.  The Bondelswarts bravely 
held their positions and continued to fire on the advancing force.  This was 
not enough to stop the advance, and night found the forces between 400 m 
and 1,6 km from their objective.  At the foot of the Guruchas hills in the 
west, the forces were holding the line in the Haib River bed, while the lower 
hills in the south, west and north were also occupied.34 
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The attack was halted for the night with the aim of commencing 
activities the next morning.  Meanwhile, a cordon was established to prevent 
any Bondelswarts from escaping.  This was ineffective as a band of 30 
horsemen, 30 donkey-riders and 290 men on foot escaped to the southeast, 
driving a small number of stock in front of them. The bombing was resumed 
at dawn on 30 May, while the force advanced towards the defensive 
Bondelswarts positions.  The order to cease fire was issued at 09:00, when 
the Bondelswarts raised white flags indicating their surrender.  Hofmeyer's 
victory was short-lived when he realised that the prize only included 90 old 
males, and 700 women and children.  Prinsloo and 45 mounted rifles were 
immediately mobilised to pursue the fleeing Bondelswarts.  Balt was tasked 
to hold the waterholes surrounding the reserve and to sweep the area for any 
Bondelswarts and livestock.  The stock rounded up totalled 13 970, which 
comprised 12 470 sheep and goats, 800 head of cattle and 700 donkeys.  The 
prisoners were escorted to Wortel, where arrangements were made to 
incarcerate them.  Hofmeyer believed the uprising had been crushed and 
sent a telegram to Smuts confirming this.  He subsequently returned to 
Kalkfontein South via Neufontein and awaited Prinsloo's report.35 
Prinsloo followed the spoor of the fleeing Bondelswarts and reported 
the same day that they had split into three groups.  The first was a group of 
approximately 70 men who were heading for Sperlingsputs, the second 
group comprised 150 men and were moving towards Kurnaims, and the 
third group consisted of 60 mounted men and 160 men on foot who were 
heading for Haibmund.  Prinsloo decided to follow the last group and 
requested the occupation of the Swarthuk, Sperlingsputs and Kurnaims 
waterholes as well as reinforcements.  The Administration’s forces moved 
out to occupy the waterholes and Balt sent Lt. Jordaan and 75 mounted rifles 
to reinforce Prinsloo.  Morris and the Bondelswarts were hampered from 
moving towards their traditional stronghold, the Fish River Canyon by the 
continued aerial reconnaissance.  Morris adapted his plan and moved into 
the Gungunib Gorge36 with the aim of fighting the pursuing force with 
guerrilla tactics.  The guerrilla tactics employed by the Bondelswarts were 
well known to Prinsloo and he remembered the lessons learned by the 
Germans 16 years earlier.  He therefore decided not to meet Morris head-on, 
but to envelope Morris by moving at night via Ramans Drift, which cut 
Morris off from the Orange River and his southern escape route, preventing 
him from continuing his retreat.37 
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The aeroplane played a vital role in neutralising the advantage of the 
terrain that Bondelswarts used so effectively against the Germans.  An 
assault was coordinated between Prinsloo and Jordaan, relayed via the 
pilots, to advance on the Bondelswarts and defeat them with aerial support.  
On 2 June, the aeroplanes, used to reconnaissance the route, found and 
engaged the Bondelswarts effectively.  The attack wreaked havoc among the 
men and livestock, while the two forces continued their advance into the 
Gungunib Gorge.  Morris concluded that their only hope was for a decisive 
defeat of their pursuers and decided to lead Prinsloo into an ambush at their 
secret waterhole, the Bergkamer.  A group of approximately 160 
Bondelswarts were not prepared to fight and moved down the Gungunib, 
skirting Prinsloo’s forces that turned back to Goodhouse to regroup for the 
next day’s advance, into the Union where they broke into smaller groups 
and disappeared.  The final stand on 3 June was poised for an annihilation of 
the advancing forces that would be boxed in facing an entrenched force.  
However, the ambush failed with snipers opening fire too soon, and the 
Bondelswarts were defeated.  Fifteen rifles were captured and 49 
Bondelswarts were killed in the battle, including Morris, with only three 
injured.  Following the spoor left by Cristiaan and his group, the force 
eventually caught up with them on 7 June in a gorge leading northwards into 
the plains.  They surrendered with 150 men and 50 rifles.38  
In the aftermath, Morris was vilified as the troublemaker by Cristiaan 
and Beukes, but their excuses did not prevent Cristiaan being sentenced to 
five years’ hard labour, while Beukes testified for the Crown and was 
pardoned.  The Bondelswarts were allowed to return to their reserve, and the 
captured livestock was returned to them, although many of the stock had 
stampeded into the desert and were never recovered.  Action was taken to 
improve their economic plight.  Work and rations were offered, medical 
assistance provided and the attendance of schools was encouraged. The few 
casualties on the side of the Administration’s forces were attributed to the 
use of air power in support of ground operations.  Close co-operation 
between the ground and air forces ensured that the aeroplanes were 
effectively utilised.  The bombing and strafing of the Bondelswarts 
attributed to a loss of morale and sapped their fighting power.  The 
aeroplane was unknown to the Bondelswarts and the psychological effect on 
them was tremendous.  Hofmeyer therefore requested Van Ryneveld and his 
pilots to fly over reserves in the Keetmanshoop area on 15 June as a show of 
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force.  The aim was to prevent any other indigenous group attempting 
anything radical in the wake of the uprising.39 
Hofmeyer was criticised severely for his handling of the uprising and 
for appointing himself as commander.  Newspapers in South West Africa, 
South Africa and England questioned his appointment and noted his lack of 
military experience.  The Labour Party criticised Smuts severely in 
Parliament.  The uprising, in the wake of the Rand strike, provided the 
Labour Party with the opportunity to criticise Smuts further.  Hofmeyer had 
acted on general guidelines and had been requested by Smuts to use 
constraint, but the leadership style of Smuts required him as Prime Minister 
to shoulder the blame.  The Native Affairs Commission was asked to 
investigate the whole affair.40  The report portrayed the sequence of events, 
but the result was clouded by the differences of opinion between Drs 
Roberts and Loram and Gen. Lemmer.  The opposition capitalised on the 
report and used it against Smuts.41 
The British press questioned the use of force against the Bondelswarts 
in a mandated territory and went as far as to describe the event as a betrayal 
of the mandate trust.  Sir Edgar Walton, the South African representative at 
the League of Nations, produced the reports on the incident on 5 September 
1922.  The League Assembly passed a resolution on 20 September 1922 for 
the Permanent Mandate Commission to investigate the matter.  The uprising 
only received attention by the League Assembly on 12 May 1924, when 
Hofmeyer was requested to appear before the Permanent Mandate 
Commission.  Their report to the League Council stated their disapproval of 
Hofmeyer's action in combining the role of military commander and the 
civil duty of Administrator.  This removed the opportunity for the 
Bondelswarts to appeal to a higher authority or for an impartial judge to 
investigate the conduct of operations.  Hofmeyer’s actions were defended by 
Smuts and he remained the Administrator.42 
The Rehoboth Uprising, 1924–1925 
During the 18th century, descendants of white colonial men and Khoisan 
women established communities that called themselves Basters (persons of 
mixed blood).43  Two Baster groups existed.  One group eventually settled 
in East Griqualand under the leadership of Adam Kok, while the second 
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group moved to Rehoboth, South West Africa, in 1870.  The Rehoboth 
Basters formed a community based on constitutional and religious beliefs, 
which were maintained by organised structures such as their elected council.  
These structures provided a strong base from which they executed self-
administration.  However, in the late 19th century, the tenure of the 
permanent Baster community on the Rehoboth land was in jeopardy due to 
constant attacks by Namas and Hereros.  The Basters’ concern for security 
and protection from attacks paved the way for a Treaty of Protection and 
Friendship on 15 September 1885 and a treaty relating to defence between 
Germany and the Rehoboth Basters on 26 July 1895 after Germany had 
proclaimed South West Africa a German Protectorate in 1884.  Germany 
provided protection while they provided men for military service.  The 
Treaty furthermore recognised the rights and liberties of the Basters in 
Rehoboth.  Internal matters were dealt with by the Baster Council, but 
disputes between the Basters and external parties were resolved by the 
German administration.  Systematic encroachment of Baster territory and 
liberties reached breaking point during the First World War.  Their 
employment as guards for prisoners of war violated the treaty, which 
prohibited their use against whites or deployment outside their territory.  
Germany rescinded the Treaties of 1885 and 1895 and the Basters sought 
Union protection.  German forces mobilised to attack the Basters in May 
1915 for their treasonous act of seeking assistance from the Union.  The 
Basters made a final stand at Sam-Kubis against the Germans on 8 May and 
defended their position with 300 armed men.  The Germans attacked Sam-
Kubis between sunrise and sunset, but retreated the next day leaving 30 
Basters dead and wounded.44 
The UDF did not mobilise to rescue the Basters because the Germans 
retreated from Rehoboth on 9 May 1915 and deployed to meet the Union 
Forces in strength.  On 9 July 1915, the German Governor, Dr Theodor 
Seitz, and Col. Victor Franke, the Commander-in-Chief of the Schutztruppe, 
surrendered to Gen. Botha at Khorab.  Martial law was instituted and the 
Basters remained in Rehoboth, working towards two goals: they wanted to 
regain their former independence and they wanted recover the land taken 
from them.  Their hope of regaining independence was rekindled when 
Botha told Van Wyk during their discussion in April 1915, “that which you 
have, at least, you will keep”.45  During the First World War, the status of 
the Basters, prior to hostilities with the German government, was reinstated.  
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The Baster Council resumed their internal administrative affairs and retained 
their Baster magistrate and other officials who dealt with legal matters, the 
collection of taxes and the granting of liquor permits.  The Baster 
community still hoped for full independence and continued their efforts to 
achieve this.46 
However, on 9 January 1922, Hofmeyer submitted a draft agreement 
on how Rehoboth would be governed, after which he and the Baster Council 
held various rounds of negotiations, which ran aground in 1922, but was 
resumed on 16 July 1923.  The two main issues that were discussed were the 
extent of their self-governance and the issue of land.  These issues were not 
resolved and insignificant concessions were made to the Basters.  The 
agreement returned the affairs of the Basters to what they had been when the 
Union invaded the territory in 1915.  Hofmeyer’s approach was no different 
from what it had been with other tribes, such as the Bondelswarts.  The 
Basters only had limited authority over local matters and were subservient to 
the Administrator and his officials in legal and political affairs.  The 
boundaries remained unchanged despite the Basters’ objections.  After the 
negotiations, the Council returned to Rehoboth to discuss the agreement 
with their community.  The community was opposed to the agreement and 
the issue was put to the vote on 9 August 1923.  The Agreement was 
rejected, but Hofmeyer made it clear that the agreement had to be signed by 
16 August and even ratified it through Proclamation No. 28 of 1923, dated 
28 September.  Festivities to celebrate the agreement were boycotted by 
many Basters, and Samuel Beukes organised the opposition to form the 
Majority Party.  The Majority Party rallied the community to reject the 
agreement and by November 1923, a campaign of passive resistance was 
instigated.  Proclamations and orders by Administration officials were 
ignored and taxes were not paid.  In the light of the repercussions from the 
Bondelswarts situation, nothing was done for fear of another backlash.47 
The Majority Party organised elections and won all the seats in the 
Council and in the Parliamentary Council.  The new Council refused to meet 
with the Administrator, who, in turn, on 5 May, issued Proclamation No. 13 
of 1924.  This Proclamation decreed that the old Council was the elected and 
properly constituted authority of Rehoboth and that a new election was to be 
held on 16 June 1924.  The new Council refused to accept the Proclamation 
and the new elections were boycotted.  The new Council continued to 
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govern over Rehoboth, collecting taxes, making their own laws and issuing 
their own permits.  The state of affairs reached boiling point when the new 
Council issued a Declaration of Independence on 1 December 1924, and the 
old Council called on the Administrator to intervene.48 
On 10 December 1924, the Administration issued Proclamation No. 
31 of 1924, which suspended the powers of the Captain and the Councils of 
the Basters and transferred power to the white magistrate, Maj. C.N. 
Manning.  The Proclamation was accompanied by a strong police 
contingent, which stepped up patrols in the area.  The new Council refused 
to submit to the conditions of Proclamation No. 31, which provided the 
Administration with ample opportunity to prosecute the offenders.  Political 
considerations stemmed the Administration’s immediate response and it was 
decided that the Basters would only be prosecuted for contravention of the 
law on cattle branding.  Manning issued a notice that everybody in 
Rehoboth had to comply in terms of Proclamation No. 36 of 1921, 
Proclamation No. 14 of 1923 and Proclamation No. 15 of 1923 with the 
regulations regarding stock branding by 1 March 1925, or face the legal 
consequences.  This included the Nama and Herero tribes also living in 
Rehoboth, who hired land from the Basters to breed stock or who worked 
for the Basters, and strongly supported the new Council.  This notice was 
totally disregarded and the magistrate issued summonses to Toko Koopman, 
a member of the new Council, Piet Diergaart, the Baster magistrate, and 
Samuel Beukes, the leader of the Majority Party.  They failed to appear in 
court and their arrest was ordered.  The police, led by Sgt H.H. Erasmus, 
were unable to arrest them, because the community prevented them from 
entering the Council offices.  The magistrate issued warrants of arrest for 
Jacobus Beukes, Petrus Job, Jacob Beukes, Daniel Beukes, David Swart, 
Frederick Draghoender, Hendrik Beukes and Nicolaas Draghoender for 
obstructing the police when they were attempting to arrest Koopman, 
Diergaart and Samuel Beukes.  In a letter to Manning, dated 28 March, the 
new Council stated that the members would not be delivered to the court 
because the warrants that were issued were based on laws the Council 
refused to acknowledge.49 
The Basters were on a collision course with the Administration, and 
the new Council called for all the Basters, Namas and Hereros in the district 
to assemble at Rehoboth.  At least 600 men gathered to await the 
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Administrator’s reaction, which sent 157 policemen to Rehoboth under the 
command of Van Coller.  They were armed with two Maxim and two Lewis 
machineguns and arrived at Rehoboth on 1 April 1925.  Van Coller waited 
for the arrival of Col. M.J. de Jager, the SWA Force Commander, and the 
Citizen Force units from the Aroab, Bethanie, Gibeon, Keetmanshoop, 
Maltahöhe, Okahandja, Warmbad, Windhoek and Rehoboth districts, which 
were mobilised the same day.  Proclamation No. 9 of 1925 instituted martial 
law on 3 April in Rehoboth and the surrounding districts.  The mobilisation 
of the Citizen Force was hampered by a shortage of horses and coal as well 
as flooding of the railway lines after the summer rains.  However, on 4 April 
1925, within 72 hours, the Citizen Force of 36 officers, 428 non-
commissioned officers and troops of which only 108 were mounted, were in 
a staging area close to Rehoboth.  The UDF supported Administration by 
sending air force elements under the command of Van Ryneveld, which 
comprised three De Havilland aeroplanes and support personnel.50 
Col. De Jager deployed his 621 men and surrounded the town of 
Rehoboth by first light on 5 April.  Lt. Col. L. Rautenbach led A Squadron 
and deployed in the ridges west of the town.  Capt. J. Balt and B Squadron 
deployed east of the town and C Squadron under the command of Capt. J.J. 
Smith was deployed as a cut-off group to prevent escape.  The police were 
on standby for deployment in the town.  The new Council received an 
ultimatum at 07:00, which demanded the unconditional surrender of 
everybody, the handing over of weapons and those Basters for whom 
warrants of arrest had been issued.  The deadline was 08:00, and De Jager 
warned the new Council that he would use violence, if necessary, if they did 
not conform to the ultimatum.  De Jager also requested them to remove all 
the non-combatants, women and children, to the north of the town to ensure 
their safety.  The new Council requested an extension until 12:00 the next 
day, but De Jager refused.  The new Council sent a second message to De 
Jager, in which they indicated their refusal to adhere to the ultimatum.  The 
air force was given the signal to take off and to start circling the town at 
08:00, the time of the deadline.  Lt. Uys and his police contingent moved 
through the town towards the Council offices to execute the warrants of 
arrest.  Uys handed the names to Jacobus Beukes, who, in turn, refused to 
deliver the men.  Uys gave them five minutes to deliver the men and when 
they still refused, he ordered a charge on the Council offices.  Everybody 
who stood in their way, including women, was removed and the men were 
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arrested.  The police rounded up the Basters with support from the 
aeroplanes, which did not fire a shot during their deployment.  The planes 
provided the psychological edge by making diving sorties over the town, 
while the police arrested 632 members of the community.  The uprising was 
suppressed within an hour and without the loss of life.  De Jager ordered by 
right of martial law that all weapons, ammunition and explosives be 
surrendered.  The police confiscated 177 rifles and various clubs and 
sticks.51 
De Jager attributed the prevention of loss of life mainly to the use of 
aeroplanes, which scared the community and distracted them from focusing 
on the land force that was moving in.  He further indicated that rapid 
mobilisation, the concentration of force, well-executed orders and the show 
of force had also contributed to a quick and successful suppression of the 
uprising.  B and C Squadrons of the Citizen Force returned to their districts 
on 6 April.  A Squadron and 100 policemen demobilised on 8 and 10 April 
respectively.  The remaining police force patrolled the area until 22 April 
and by 30 April; the local police force was once again in charge of the area.  
Martial law was lifted on 11 May 1925.  Hofmeyer received permission to 
use the air force for “show of force” demonstrations on 1 April 1925, as was 
done in 1922 after the Bondelswarts uprising.  Bombing of targets and 
subsequent use of high explosive charges supplemented the air shows.  The 
air shows were presented at Otjiwarongo, Tsumeb, Ondonga, Namatoni, 
Ovitot Reserve, Windhoek, Schiethof, Vaalgras Reserve and Keetmanshoop.  
The local tribes were intimidated by the air shows and feared the use of 
aeroplanes against them.  However, the air shows gave away the element of 
surprise but, since the tribes lacked an adequate military response to 
neutralise the aeroplane, the areas remained free of uprisings.  The air force 
element returned to Pretoria on 24 April 1925.52 
The group of 632 arrested at Rehoboth consisted of 289 Basters, 218 
Hereros, 75 Namas and 50 Damaras.  A group of 226 was set free, but the 
remaining 406 appeared before the Windhoek magistrate, A.R. Wilmot, in 
the Rehoboth magistrate’s court between 7 and 9 April.  Judgement was 
passed and those found guilty were sentenced from between £30 or three 
months in jail to £2 and one month in jail.  Considering the impoverished 
nature of the Rehoboth, few of the fines were paid, and 319 were 
imprisoned, of whom 68 served the full sentence.  During a visit by the 
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Prince of Wales on 4 May 1925, the rest of the group was released from 
prison as a gesture of good will.  Jacob de Villiers, a judge from the 
Appellate Division of the Union, was appointed to head a commission of 
inquiry into the uprising and submitted his report on 26 September 1926.  
The Basters continually sent petitions to the Permanent Mandates 
Commission until 1932, when the commission decided in favour of the 
Administration and indicated that the Basters did not really have 
independence and had therefore no grounds for further petitions.  It also 
decided that the Basters were not fit to rule themselves and that the 
Administration should take appropriate action.  The Administration placed 
the management of Rehoboth under the white magistrate, who was advised 
by an advisory council, which consisted of three elected and three appointed 
Basters.  The suppression of the revolt and the subsequent air shows were a 
clear indication to the rest of the tribes in South West Africa that recalcitrant 
communities would be severely dealt with.53 
Military Action against Chief Ipumbu of the Ukuambi Tribe, 1932 
Apart from the trouble with the Bondelswarts and the Rehoboth Basters, the 
Administration had to deal with Chief Ipumbu who continuously 
disregarded its authority.  Chief Ipumbu of the Ukuambi tribe in 
Ovamboland was not convinced by the Administration’s show of force.  He 
defied the authorities and launched a raid against the Ukuanyama tribe in 
November 1921.  Subsequent talks with the chief failed and Hofmeyer fined 
Chief Ipumbu 20 head of cattle for his offence.  Chief Ipumbu’s modus 
operandi was to promise the payment; then always having excuses why he 
could not pay by the time of the deadline.  Chief Ipumbu was sent an 
ultimatum in June 1923 to pay the fine and to surrender his arms and 
ammunition.  He reluctantly paid only 10 head of cattle and refused to 
surrender his arms and ammunition.  This set the stage for a punitive 
expedition against Chief Ipumbu, but in the light of the Bondelswarts 
debacle and the cost of a ground force, no military action was taken.  Further 
negotiations were held and the chief eventually paid the remaining 10 head 
of cattle on 27 November 1923.54 
The rest of the tribes in Ovamboland watched the debacle with great 
interest.  The population of Ovamboland was estimated at about 150 000 
(see Figure 2: Boundaries of Ovamboland tribes).  All the tribal leaders in 
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Ovamboland, except Ipumbu, accepted the Administration’s authority.  It 
was in the best interest of the Administration to appear strong in the eyes of 
the tribal leaders and leading headmen to ensure obedience.  Chief Ipumbu, 
however, did not openly oppose the Administration after he had paid the 
fine in 1923.  His reign over his tribe continued and was characterised by 
tyranny and forced obedience.  The chief of an Ovambo tribe was the 
ultimate authority and he ruled autocratically.  Custom forbade any member 
to question his rule, and Chief Ipumbu exercised this authority with zeal.  
He also overstepped the legal boundaries and executed members without 
trial.  The Finnish missionaries in Ovamboland complained of his actions 
and the neighbouring tribes severed ties with the Ukuambi.  Several 
Ukuambi headmen left to reside with other tribes, but Chief Ipumbu 
continued to harass the missionaries and their converts.55 
In July 1931, Chief Ipumbu ordered that Christian girls from his tribe 
be brought to him to participate in rites practised on the attainment of 
puberty.  Some of the Christian girls discovered his intent to violate them 
and escaped capture.  They sought sanctuary at the Finnish Mission, which 
Rev. Aho, head of the mission, provided.  The relationship between the 
Mission and Chief Ipumbu was poor at the best of times and was further 
exacerbated by this turn of events.  Revds Aho and Liljebad were 
occasionally shot at, but purposely missed.  An indigenous teacher from the 
mission was also assaulted as the harassment continued.  The Native 
Commissioner, Capt. C.H.L. Hahn, warned Chief Ipumbu to put an end to 
his misconduct, whereby the chief solemnly promised that it would never 
happen again.  Ipumbu’s promise was short-lived and trouble between the 
Mission and the chief erupted again on 30 December 1931.  Chief Ipumbu 
intended to take one of his own daughters, Nekulu, as a wife.  This was 
forbidden by tribal custom, but the chief was adamant and pursued the 
union.  Nekulu escaped to the Mission where she received sanctuary.  This 
entitled Nekulu to stay at the Mission as long as the patron of sanctuary, 
Revd Aho, occupied the Mission.  Chief Ipumbu disregarded the custom and 
demanded the return of the girl, which was refused.  Chief Ipumbu and 300 
men armed with breech-loading rifles searched the Mission without success.  
They withdrew from the Mission, but maintained a cordon.  Rifles and 
arrows were randomly fired at the Mission and its inhabitants.  Nekulu was 
smuggled into a motorcar and was removed to Onandjokue, a Finnish 
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Mission near Ondonga.  Chief Ipumbu returned to his kraal after a thorough 
search of the Mission failed to deliver his intended bride.56 
Because of these events, A.J. Werth, the Administrator, decided to 
fine Chief Ipumbu 10 head of cattle and requested an aircraft and a tank to 
assist his officials in enforcing their authority.  He argued that a ground 
force would be too costly and would inevitably lead to bloodshed.  He was 
of the opinion that a demonstration would be sufficient to cow the chief into 
paying the fine without any bloodshed.  No tank was available, but Van 
Ryneveld, 24 men and three Westland Wapiti57 aircraft were dispatched 
from Pretoria.  A special train with supplies for the Air Force left on 21 July 
and the aircraft took off on 23 July.  The aircraft arrived in Windhoek on the 
evening of 23 July and a conference was immediately held with Van 
Ryneveld attending.  Hahn was instructed on 24 July to relay to Chief 
Ipumbu that his initial fine of 10 head of cattle had been increased with an 
additional 40 head of cattle.  He had to pay a total of 50 head of cattle for 
contempt of authority and non-compliance.  If the chief did not pay the fine, 
Hahn was to inform him that he should surrender himself to the 
Administration to be dealt with in accordance with Section 1 of the Native 
Administration Proclamation No. 15 of 1928.  If he failed to comply, he 
would ipso facto be deposed as Chief of the Ukuambi.  This message would 
be delivered under air cover to indicate the Administration’s willingness to 
carry out the threat.58 
On 27 July, Hahn informed Chief Ipumbu, who listened attentively, of 
the newly imposed fine.  He made numerous excuses for not paying the 
initial fine in time and committed himself to paying the 50 head of cattle on 
1 August.  The payment was not made and Hahn sent three messengers to 
the chief to deliver an ultimatum that he surrender at Mtswi on 3 August.  
Under customary law, the chief was not allowed to leave the boundary of his 
tribal lands.  Mtswi was just inside Chief Ipumbu’s tribal land close to the 
boundary.  Hahn was awaiting Ipumbu’s surrender, with the aeroplanes 
providing air cover, when he received a message from Ipumbu requesting 
him to be at a location about 13 km from the chief’s kraal at 15:30.  Hahn 
moved to the new location, but instead of the chief, 60 armed men awaited 
him as well as a total of 200 tribesmen hiding in the surrounding bush.  He 
was requested to enter the kraal, but Hahn declined for fear of treachery and 
his own safety.  Chief Ipumbu did not meet with Hahn.  Hahn proceeded to 
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give the armed detail of 60 Ukuambi a bombing demonstration and ordered 
them to inform Chief Ipumbu of their observations.  Hahn returned to 
Otjiwarongo to brief the Administrator.59 
 
Figure 2: Boundaries of Ovamboland tribes.60 
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Werth, Van Ryneveld, Van Coller and Hahn met on 5 August to 
discuss further steps against Chief Ipumbu.  The chief was seen as the 
central figure in the situation.  The removal of Ipumbu as chief would 
eradicate the problems facing the Administration in Ovamboland.  Ipumbu 
refused to accept the Administration’s authority, had taken rifles from older 
men and given them to younger, reliable men, removed all the women and 
children, stationed picket lines around his kraal and had clear intentions of 
meeting any action with force.  Three options on how to remove Chief 
Ipumbu by force were considered.  The first option was to launch a surgical 
air strike and kill Ipumbu.  The second option was to use the air strike to kill 
him and his bodyguards, and the third option was to discredit Ipumbu in the 
eyes of his tribe.  To facilitate this, he had to be frightened of losing his 
tribal land, and his kraal had to be occupied and destroyed.  Tribal custom 
would ensure that this was seen as a defeat for Ipumbu.  The third option 
was decided on because it held the best chance of settling the dispute 
without bloodshed, which suited the Prime Minister, Gen. Hertzog.  In order 
to execute an occupation of the kraal two armoured cars were requested on 5 
August.61 
The military objective of the operation was to ensure the surrender or 
capture of Chief Ipumbu.  Hahn’s intelligence network confirmed that the 
majority of the tribe of 8 000 would welcome the intervention, but a small 
following of 300 men would probably support Chief Ipumbu.  Hahn was 
instructed to try once more to settle the dispute, with the added request that 
the Ukuambi be disarmed.  When the message was given to Chief Ipumbu, 
he sent an evasive reply and did not take the matter seriously.  He was duly 
informed that he had disobeyed the Administration long enough and that he 
was no longer the recognised chief of the Ukuambi.  He had to surrender 
immediately or else action would be taken to secure him dead or alive.  
Aerial reconnaissance continued while the Administration waited for the 
armoured cars to arrive.  Two Crossley armoured cars62 with a crew of five 
men left Pretoria on 8 August under the command of Lt. J.B. Kriegler.  They 
arrived in Windhoek on 11 August and acquired a six-wheeler Thorneycroft 
truck to assist their advance towards Ovamboland.  The journey of 440 km 
was mostly sand and the armoured cars struggled to advance.  The front 
wheels were solid and narrow and due to the weight of the car, sank into the 
soft sand repeatedly.  One armoured car was left at Otjiwarongo with a 
broken water pipe, while the second car continued its demanding journey 
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north.  It eventually arrived at the staging area near Ondonga on 14 August 
and preparations were made for the upcoming assault.  Kriegler was flown 
over the target area immediately after his arrival to show him his line of 
advance and the rendezvous point near the kraal.  Hundreds of pamphlets 
were dropped over the kraal while the last reconnaissance flight was taking 
place.  The pamphlet read “Ipumbu was instructed by the Administration to 
surrender himself.  He has not done so.  He is no longer chief of Ukuambi.  
Tomorrow (Monday) his kraal will be destroyed.  Everybody is warned to 
keep away.”  The pamphlets were picked up and read by the inhabitants of 
the kraal.63 
The air force and the armoured car had to work closely together and a 
code of signals was prepared.  The system of communication included the 
following: 
• The use of the Popham Panel, which consisted of a series of 
white canvas strips, put out on the ground to spell out a 
prearranged code to the pilot and observer; 
• Message dropping by the aeroplane; 
• Message pick-up by the aeroplane.  (The message would be 
placed in a small canvas wrapping attached to a piece of string 
7,5 m long.  The string would be placed on two 2–2,4 m poles.  
The aeroplane was equipped with a hook or a weight attached to 
a string, which would catch onto the message wire as the pilot 
flew over.  The observer would then pull up the message); and  
• Wireless telephone between aircraft and armoured car.64 
At 09:00 on the morning of 15 August, the armoured car with Hahn, 
Kriegler and the rest of the ground crew waited for the aeroplanes to 
commence bombing.  Warriors around the kraal moved off as soon as the 
bombing commenced and the kraal was deserted.  The end of the bombing 
was the signal for Kriegler to debus from the armoured car and to set the 
kraal on fire.  This was hampered by a sudden attack of bees, which had 
been disturbed by the bombing.  Very pistols were fired to smoke out the 
bees and eventually the kraal was set on fire.  The perimeter was secured 
and large quantities of ammunition were found around the kraal where it had 
been left by the armed men when they departed.  The ground force quickly 
138 
 
  
ascertained that Chief Ipumbu had left early that morning with twenty men 
and gone to one of his cattle kraals, Mevethia, some 13 km from the main 
kraal.  He left with orders that the men should stay until he returned.  Upon 
hearing the news, the aeroplanes immediately took off for a follow-up 
operation with Hahn as observer to identify the kraal.  Chief Ipumbu heard 
the aeroplanes approach and escaped into the bush towards the Portuguese 
border (Angola).65  The aeroplanes proceeded to bomb the kraal and killed 
50 head of cattle owned by Chief Ipumbu.  This was deemed appropriate, as 
this was equivalent to the fine that had not yet been paid.  The aeroplanes 
returned to Ondonga, but the armoured car took up a defensive position 
outside the main kraal.66 
Members of the Ukuambi tribe returned to the main kraal the day after 
the bombing.  Van Ryneveld and Hahn addressed influential members of the 
tribe and informed them that their quarrel was with Ipumbu and not with the 
Ukuambi.  They were to surrender their weapons and ammunition and call a 
tribal meeting for Friday, 19 August.  Rifles and ammunition were 
surrendered during the course of the week and by Friday, 500 rifles had been 
handed in.  The tribal meeting was attended by 1 300 adult male Ukuambi 
members and Van Ryneveld.  Smit, the Secretary for South West Africa, 
addressed them.  Van Ryneveld explained the military aspect of the past 
events and Smit explained the Administration’s future policy.  In the light of 
the trouble with Ipumbu, no successor would be appointed.  The 
Administration continued to implement a divide and rule policy in 
Ovamboland.  The Ukuambi would be governed by the system successfully 
used by the Ukanyama.  This entailed that the tribal area would be split into 
areas where a headman, approved and appointed by the Administration, 
would be in charge.  The headmen would be obeyed, but the final authority 
would rest with the Administration’s representative, the Native 
Commissioner, Hahn.  The system was instantly accepted by the tribe and 
implemented in due course.  A few days later news reached Van Ryneveld 
and Hahn that Ipumbu had been refused entrance into Angola.  He was 
wandering around in the Ukanyama territory when trackers caught up with 
him. He was arrested and flown to Ondonga on 22 August where he was 
placed in custody.  Tribal custom prevailed and Ipumbu had deposed 
himself from his chieftainship by leaving his tribal boundaries.  Thus, the 
troublesome Ipumbu was deposed as chief without bloodshed.  The 
armoured car returned to Pretoria on 23 August and the aeroplanes on 29 
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August.  The aeroplanes were utilised to visit all the tribal leaders in 
Ovamboland.  These visits, under friendly conditions, were used to 
underline the Administration’s position of power and to confirm their 
authority.  The aeroplane, a powerful military and political resource, ensured 
this authority.67 
Conclusion 
The colonisation of the African continent by predominantly European 
powers instituted white dominance over indigenous African and Arab 
populations by the end of the nineteenth century.  The technological 
advantage and the superior military organisation of the European settlers 
ensured military victory in the long run when it was pitted against inferior 
indigenous weapons and tactics.  Britain, France and Germany were three 
prominent powers participating in the colonisation process, and resistance 
by local populations against their colonial governments was severely 
suppressed.  The British style of policing a colony was prominent in South 
Africa, and later became entwined with the Dutch style present in South 
Africa before the British arrived.  A fear of black uprisings troubled white 
settler communities, and the task of ensuring peace in the rural areas of 
South Africa fell upon the shoulders of the civil police, paramilitary and 
military units.  They were responsible for suppressing unrest and policing 
race relations, which included not only white and black relations, but 
Afrikaner and British relations as well.  The British style of colonial 
policing remained paramount.  Local unrest against the governing structures 
was suppressed and the indigenous population policed to ensure peace. The 
new UDF continued this policing style from its inception in 1912.  British 
military influence provided the permanent force of the UDF, the SAMR, 
with a specific role when it was not preparing to fight a conventional battle.  
The SAMR was to be applied as a mounted policing body in the rural areas. 
The pre-Union feature of military policing still prevailed in South Africa.  
The role and application of the UDF was a continuation of the military 
policing of the colonial regime and present in the forces within the SWA 
mandated territory.  It provided the Union and the SWA Administration with 
the means to suppress popular uprisings against government rule, whether 
black or white.  The UDF was subsequently put to the test in its peacetime 
role with the suppression of white uprisings in the Union with the Rebellion 
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and the white mineworkers’ strikes, but also indigenous uprisings in South 
West Africa. 
The punitive measures against the Bondelswarts, Rehoboth and 
Ukuambi received criticism of varying degrees.  The Bondelswarts affair 
received serious international criticism and was labelled as a betrayal of the 
sacred mandate trust.  The Permanent Mandates Commission criticised 
Hofmeyer’s actions and Smuts encountered political criticism in Parliament, 
led by the opposition leader, Hertzog.  Yet Hertzog, as the new Prime 
Minister after the 1924 election, sanctioned expeditions against the 
Rehoboth Basters and Chief Ipumbu.  The use of force to suppress internal 
uprisings in SWA was not an uncommon occurrence, but was viewed in a 
dim light by the League of Nations.  As a C-class mandate, it was 
administered with the intention of providing for the indigenous people an 
opportunity for social development and the enhancement of material and 
moral wellbeing. 
The importation of Union legislation and policies to SWA to control 
labour and to segregate according to race fermented growing opposition 
amongst the indigenous populations.  Uprisings were inevitable as 
grievances were pushed aside.  Obedience to the police and policies, racial, 
social and economic, was expected.  Inevitably, conflicts arose when the 
Bondelswarts and the Rehoboth questioned policy regarding livestock and 
segregation.  Chief Ipumbu, however, did not only contravene Union laws 
by directly opposing the Administration, but tribal laws too.  The 
contravention of laws governing livestock, taxes and his defiance against the 
Administration placed the SWA Administration and the Union under 
pressure to resolve the problem quickly.  Contravention of laws required that 
action be taken against some indigenous people of SWA, regardless of the 
merits of their grievances.  The failure of Administration to take cognisance 
and act upon the grievances, only applying the prevailing legislation, led to 
punitive measures, which was a practiced and accepted way of dealing with 
uprisings at the time. 
Traditional punitive forces consisted of mounted or foot soldiers, but 
the advent of the aeroplane supplemented this force structure.  Joint air–
ground operations were executed with success in SWA and the aeroplane 
and armoured cars were instrumental in their successes.  The aeroplane was 
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a force multiplier and was quickly mobilised when immediate action was 
necessary and it provided the authorities with the element of surprise when 
they used it against groups armed with rifles that had the home-ground 
advantage.  Its use against the Rehoboth Basters and the Ukuambi ensured a 
quick resolution of the situation and limited casualties all round.  The 
exception to this was the Bondelswarts, and the subsequent criticism was 
instrumental in the more careful approach with the Rehoboth Basters and the 
Ukuambi.   
The tactical advantage to the military and police forces applied in 
suppressing the unrests were their ability to mobilise quickly and position 
themselves for a quick advance.  The Bondelswarts were laid siege to when 
the waterholes were seized and they were prevented from launching attacks 
on outlying areas for supplies and ammunition.  However, they managed to 
escape south with the aim to continue fighting guerrilla-style as they did 
with the Germans.  The aeroplane hampered their ability to move undetected 
and prevented them from organising themselves effectively.  The co-
operation between the aeroplane and the ground forces provide an excellent 
description of the tactical application of joint operations.  Another good 
example of this is the co-operation between the ground forces and the air 
force during the Rehoboth uprising.  The aeroplane was instrumental in 
proving the psychological edge to the Administration and its use during the 
ground force advance to arrest the members with outstanding warrants 
directly contributed to no exchange of fire between opposing forces. 
The traditional use of ground forces to subdue recalcitrant groups was 
waived in the actions against the Ukuambi.  The aeroplane provided the 
alternative to ground forces, especially when the distance to Ovamboland 
was considered to be a tactical limitation for ground forces.  However, 
ground forces were required for the operation since the decision was made 
to occupy Ipumbu’s kraal, which the aeroplane was unable to do.  Mounted 
troops gave way to two armoured cars, which provided another 
psychological edge.  In hindsight, the armoured cars deployed with great 
difficulty and achieved limited tactical successes, but prevented the 
prolonged exposure of soldiers to possible enemy attacks.  Its use provided 
ground forces needed to occupy the kraal without the need to send mounted 
soldiers while the aeroplane was the force multiplier that limited the amount 
of troops needed.   
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